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Abstract
Assuming that agents’ preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance, we show how the
Expected Utility paradigm can rationalize all optimal investment choices: the optimal investment
strategy in any behavioral law-invariant (state-independent) setting corresponds to the optimum
for an expected utility maximizer with an explicitly derived concave non-decreasing utility function.
This result enables us to infer the utility and risk aversion of agents from their investment choice
in a non-parametric way. We relate the property of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) to
distributional properties of the terminal wealth and of the financial market. Specifically, we show
that DARA is equivalent to a demand for a terminal wealth that has more spread than the opposite
of the log pricing kernel at the investment horizon.
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1 Introduction
First suggested by Bernoulli (1738) and rigorously introduced in the economic literature by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1947), Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has for decades been the dominant
theory for making decisions under risk. Nonetheless, this framework has been criticized for not always
being consistent with agents’ observed behavior (e.g., the paradox of Allais (1953), Starmer (2000)).
In response to this criticism, numerous alternatives have been proposed, most notably dual theory
(Yaari (1987)), rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin (1993)) and cumulative prospect theory (Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992)). These competing theories differ significantly, but all three typically satisfy
first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). Indeed, many economists consider violation of this property as
grounds for refuting a particular model; see for example Birnbaum (1997), Birnbaum and Navarrette
(1998), and Levy (2008) for empirical evidence of FSD violations. Recall also that although the original
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provides explanations for previously unexplained
phenomena, it violates FSD. To overcome this potential drawback, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
developed cumulative prospect theory.
In the presence of a continuum of states, we show that the optimal portfolio in any behavioral
theory that respects FSD can be rationalized by the expected utility setting, i.e., it is the optimal
portfolio for an expected utility maximizer with an explicitly known concave utility function. This
implied utility function is unique up to a linear transformation among concave functions and can thus
be used for further analyses of preferences, such as to infer the risk aversion of investors.
A surprising feature is that we only assume that the preferences respect FSD, which contrasts
to earlier results on the rationalization of investment choice under expected utility theory. Dybvig
((1988a), Appendix A), Peleg and Yaari (1975) and Zilcha and Chew (1990), among others, have worked
on this problem assuming that preferences preserve second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). However,
being SSD-preserving is quite a strong assumption, and while consistency with FSD is inherent, and
even enforced, in most decision theories, this is not readily the case for SSD. For instance, rank
dependent utility theory satisfies FSD but not SSD (Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), Ryan (2006)), and
the same holds true for cumulative prospect theory (see e.g., Baucells and Heukamp (2006)). Thus,
our results show that for any agent behaving according to the cumulative prospect theory (i.e., for a
“CPT investor”) there is a corresponding expected utility maximizer with concave utility purchasing
the same optimal portfolio, even if the CPT investor can exhibit risk seeking behavior with respect to
losses. This approach, however, is not intended to dispense with alternative models to expected utility
theory, as they have been developed mainly to compare gambles and not to deal with optimal portfolio
selection per se.
Our results are rooted in the basic insight that under some assumptions, the marginal utility
at a given consumption level is proportional to the ratio of risk-neutral probabilities and physical
probabilities (Nau and Mccardle (1991), Duffie (2010), Pennacchi (2008)). At first, it then seems
obvious to infer a (concave) utility function and the risk aversion from the optimal consumption of the
investor. However, the characterization that the marginal utility is proportional to the pricing kernel
at a given consumption level is valid only if the utility is differentiable at this consumption level. This
observation renders the rationalization of investment choices by the expected utility theory non-trivial,
as there are many portfolios for which the implied utility is not differentiable at all consumption levels,
such as the purchase of options or capital guarantee products. Furthermore, in a discrete setting
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(with a finite number of equiprobable states) there are many utility functions that are consistent with
optimal consumption. In this context, Peleg and Yaari (1975) give one potential implied utility, but
there are many others. In the presence of a continuum of states, when the pricing kernel is continuously
distributed, we are able to derive the unique (up to a linear transformation) concave utility function
that is implied by the optimal consumption of any investor who respects FSD.
The proof of our main results builds on Dybvig’s (1988a, 1988b) seminal work on portfolio selection.
Instead of optimizing a value function, Dybvig (1988a) specifies a target distribution and solves for
the strategy that generates the distribution at the lowest possible cost. 1 Our results are also related
to earlier work on revealed preferences by Afriat (1972) and Varian (1982, 2006), whose analyses aim
at understanding the preferences of a consumer who has to choose among bundles of goods, given a
budget constraint. Their original problem can be formulated as follows. Given a set of observations of
prices and quantities for a finite number of goods observed over some period of time, is it possible to
find a utility function that rationalizes the observed portfolio choices? That is, at any time t, the utility
obtained by the portfolio of goods (observed at time t) is at least as good as any other available portfolio
at time t for this utility. If the set of observed price-quantity pairs satisfies some inequalities (called
cyclical consistency), Afriat (1972) proves the existence of an increasing, continuous and concave utility
function. Here, we analyze the idea of inferring preferences for consumers who are investing in the
financial market. We show that if their portfolio satisfies some conditions, then it can be rationalized
by expected utility theory with a non-decreasing and concave function. Although our analysis appears
to be a natural extension (see Theorem 3 and Remark 2), it differs fundamentally from Afriat’s work in
a few aspects. First, Afriat (1972), Varian (1982, 2006) and most of the subsequent work on revealed
preferences has been done in a “certainty” framework (utility setting), whereas, in the financial market,
the future consumption for each unit invested is unknown (expected utility setting). Secondly, Afriat’s
(1972) approach relies on an ex-post analysis of a sequence of observed consumptions in time, whereas
our analysis studies the ex-ante properties of a future consumption bundle in a one-period setting.
Finally, we assume that there is an infinite number of states in which it is possible to invest, whereas
the analyses of Afriat (1972) and Varian (1982, 2006) are formulated with a finite number of states.
The assumption that we make is natural in the context of optimal portfolio selection problems. It
allows to obtain the uniqueness of the implied concave utility and to be able to use this inferred utility
to estimate risk aversion, for instance.
Inference of risk preferences from observed investment behavior has also been studied by Sharpe
(2007), Sharpe, Goldstein and Blythe (2000), Dybvig and Rogers (1997) and Musiela and Zariphopoulos
(2010).2 Sharpe (2007) and Sharpe et al. (2000) assume a static setting and rely on Dybvig’s (1988b)
results to estimate the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion for a CRRA utility based on target
distributions of final wealth.
In this paper, we establish a link between expected utility theory (EUT) and all other theories that
1It may indeed be more natural for an investor to describe her target distribution of terminal wealth instead of her
utility function. For example, Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe (2008) discuss how to estimate the distribution at retirement
using a questionnaire. The pioneering work in portfolio selection by Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952) is based solely on
the mean and variance of returns and does not invoke utility functions. Black (1988) calls a utility function “a foreign
concept for most individuals” and states that “instead of specifying his preferences among various gambles the individual
can specify his consumption function”.
2Under some conditions, Dybvig and Rogers (1997) and Musiela and Zariphopoulos (2010) infer utility from dynamic
investment decisions. Our setting is static and well adapted to the investment practice by which consumers purchase a
financial contract and do not trade afterwards.
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respects FSD. This connection can be used to estimate the agents’ utility functions and risk aversion
coefficients in a non-expected utility setting. Our approach in doing so is non-parametric and is based
solely on knowledge of the distribution of optimal wealth and of the financial market. This is in contrast
to traditional approaches to inferring utility and risk aversion, which specify an exogenous parametric
utility function in isolation of the market in which the agent invests and then calibrate this utility
function using laboratory experiments and econometric analysis of panel data.
It is widely accepted that the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing with
wealth. This feature - i.e., decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) - is often the motivation for using
the CRRA utility instead of the exponential utility to model investors’ preferences. In this paper,
we show that the DARA property is completely characterized by a demand for final wealth W that
exhibits more spread than a certain market variable (which we define in a precise sense in the paper).
Our characterization of DARA can be used to empirically test DARA preferences based on observed
investment decisions.
2 Introductory Example
Throughout this paper, we consider agents with law-invariant and non-decreasing preferences,3 V (·).
We say that V (·) is non-decreasing if, for consumptions X and Y satisfying X 6 Y , one has that
V (X) 6 V (Y ). We say that V (·) is law-invariant if X ∼ Y implies that V (X) = V (Y ), where “∼”
reflects equality in distribution. This is often referred as a “state-independent” set of preferences. We
also assume that the agent’s initial budget is finite.
In this section, we present an example in order to introduce the notation and to explain in a
simplified setting (a space with a finite number of equal probable states) why a distribution of terminal
wealth can always be obtained as the optimum of the maximization of expected utility for a risk averse
agent. We will also show the limitations of this discrete setting and how it fails to identify the implied
concave utility function and implied risk aversion of the investor.
The introductory example takes place in a finite state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωN} consisting of N
equiprobable states (with probability 1N ) at some terminal time T . Denote by
ξ(ωi)
N the initial (positive)
cost at time 0 of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays one unit in the ith state, ωi, at time T and zero
otherwise. Let us call ξ := (ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξN ) the pricing kernel where ξi := ξ(ωi). It is clear that any
state-contingent consumption X := (x1, x2, ..., xN ) (with xi := X(ωi)) at time T writes as a linear
combination of the N Arrow–Debreu securities.
The optimal investment problem of the agent with preferences V (·) is to find the optimal consump-
tion X∗ by solving the optimization problem,
max
X | E[ξX]=X0
V (X), (1)
where the budget constraint E[ξX] = 1N
∑N
i=1 ξixi = X0 reflects that the agent’s initial wealth level
is X0. We assume that an optimum X
∗ to Problem (1) exists (it is always the case when restricting
3This assumption is present in most traditional decision theories including expected utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947)), Yaari’s dual theory (Yaari (1987)), the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992))
and rank dependent utility theory (Quiggin (1993)).
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to non-negative consumptions). Denote by x∗i := X
∗(ωi). Observe then that X∗ and ξ must be
anti-monotonic4; in other words, the outcomes for X∗ are ordered in reverse of the ones for ξ, or
∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, (ξ(ω)− ξ(ω′)) (X∗(ω)−X∗(ω′)) 6 0. (2)
Let us prove (2) by contradiction. To this end, assume that there exist two states, ωi and ωj, such that
ξi > ξj and x
∗
i > x
∗
j . Let Y be another consumption such that Y (ω) = X
∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω\ {ωi, ωj},
and Y (ωi) = x
∗
j , Y (ωj) = x
∗
i . Since all states are equiprobable, X ∼ Y implies that V (X) = V (Y ) by
the law-invariance of V (·). However, Y has a strictly lower cost, i.e.,
E[ξX∗]− E[ξY ] = 1
N
(ξi − ξj)(x∗i − x∗j) > 0.
Hence, X∗ cannot be optimal as V (X∗) < V (Z) in which Z = Y +E[ξX
∗]−E[ξY ]
E[ξ] (note that E[ξZ] = X0).
Without loss of generality, using (2), we can thus assume that x∗1 6 x
∗
2 6 ... 6 x
∗
N and ξ1 > ξ2 > ... >
ξN . For ease of exposition, we suppose in addition that the inequalities are strict (see Peleg and Yaari
(1975) for the most general case):
x∗1 < x
∗
2 < ... < x
∗
N , ξ1 > ξ2 > ... > ξN .
Proposition 1 (Rationalizing Investment in a Discrete Setting). The optimal solution of (1), denoted
by X∗ also solves the maximum expected utility problem
max
X | E[ξX]=X0
E[U(X)] (3)
for any concave utility U(·) such that the left derivative5 denoted by U ′ exists in x∗i for all i and satisfies
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, U ′(x∗i ) = ξi. (4)
The proof of Proposition 1 given in Appendix A.1 uses the concavity of U and is a basic application
of pathwise optimization. It is clear from Proposition 1 that the utility function U(·) that rationalizes
the optimal investment choice X∗ in this setting is not unique. The candidate utility UP (·) proposed
by Peleg and Yaari (1975) is given by
UP (x) =
∫ x
0
v(y)dy
where v(y) = ξ1−y+x∗1 for y < x∗1 and v(y) = ξj+(y−x∗j )
(ξj+1−ξj)
(x∗j+1−x∗j ) for y ∈ [x
∗
j , x
∗
j+1) (j = 1, 2, ..., N−1)
and v(y) = ξN for y > x
∗
N . UP (·) is differentiable at all x∗i and satisfies the condition U ′P (x∗i ) = ξi
of Proposition 1. It will be clear later that if we use this utility and generalize the financial market
to have a continuum of states, then X∗ no longer solves (3). In this paper, we introduce6 a utility
4This observation appeared in Peleg and Yaari (1975) (as the principle of decreasing willingness in Theorem 1) and in
Dybvig (1988a, 1988b).
5The results can also be written in terms of right derivative.
6The formula for U(·) in (5) will appear more intuitive after reading the proof of Theorem 2 in the following section.
It is built so that the optimum for the expected utility problem (3) corresponds to the cheapest strategy with distribution
F .
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function U(·)
U(x) =
∫ x
x∗1
F−1ξ (1− F (y))dy, (5)
where F (·) is the distribution function (cdf) of X∗, Fξ(·) is the cdf of ξ and the quantile function F−1ξ
is defined as F−1ξ (p) = inf{t | Fξ(t) > p} with the convention that F−1ξ (0) = 0. One observes that
y 7→ F−1ξ (1 − F (y)) is a decreasing right-continuous step function (taking the value ξ1 for y < x∗1,
ξi+1 when y ∈ [x∗i , x∗i+1) for i = 1, ..., N − 1, and the value 0 for y > x∗N ). Thus, U(·) is continuous,
piecewise linear and concave satisfying U(x∗1) = 0. It is differentiable at all points except at each x
∗
i ,
i = 1, 2, ..., N , where it has a distinct right and left derivative. Denote by U ′(·) the left derivative of
U(·). We have that condition (4) of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Moreover, Theorem 4 will show that it is
the unique (generalized) utility that explains the demand for X∗ in the market when ξ is continuously
distributed.
Henceforth, we assume that the state price ξ is continuously distributed, and we extend the above
construction to the more general market (infinite state space) in Section 4. Doing so is not only a
technical extension, but rather natural in the context of making optimal investment choices and at
least consistent with the literature on it. As the example illustrates, it is also necessary in order to
define the utility function (up to a linear transformation) that rationalizes the demand for a given
optimal consumption X∗, and that can thus be used to compute the implied risk aversion of the
investor.
When requiring that the utility function is differentiable at all points, we will show that we can
only explain continuous distributions. However, there are many situations in which the investor wants
a discrete distribution of wealth or a mixed distribution. He and Zhou (2011) show that, under
some assumptions, optimal payoffs in Yaari’s dual theory have a discrete distribution, whereas in the
case of cumulative prospect theory, the optimal final wealth has a mixed distribution. While these
observations point to differences between the decision theories, we show that these optimal payoffs can
be rationalized by (generalized) expected utility theory. Section 5 provides some applications of the
results derived in Section 4. In particular, we illustrate how a non-decreasing concave utility function
can be constructed to explain the demand for optimal investment in Yaari’s (1987) setting. One of the
key findings presented toward the end of the paper (Section 6) is to infer risk aversion and to show
that DARA is equivalent to a demand for terminal wealth that exhibits more spread than the market
variable HT := − log(ξT ).
3 Setting
We assume an arbitrage-free and frictionless financial market (Ω,F ,P) with a fixed investment horizon
of T > 0. Let ξT be the pricing kernel that is agreed upon by all agents. We assume that it has a
positive density on R+\{0}. The value X0 at time 0 of a consumption XT at T is then computed as
X0 = E[ξTXT ].
We consider only terminal consumptions XT such that X0 is finite. Throughout the paper, agents
have law-invariant and non-decreasing preferences V (·). Theorem 1 shows that these properties are
equivalent to preferences V (·) that respect FSD. X ≺fsd Y means that Y is (first-order) stochastically
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larger than X, i.e., for all x ∈ R, FX(x) > FY (x), where FX and FY denote the cumulative distribution
functions (cdfs) of X and Y respectively. Equivalently for all non-decreasing functions v, E[v(X)] 6
E[v(Y )].
Theorem 1. Preferences V (·) are non-decreasing and law-invariant if and only if V (·) satisfies FSD.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.2. An agent with preferences V (·) finds her
optimal terminal consumption X∗T by solving the following optimization problem:
max
XT | E[ξTXT ]=X0
V (XT ). (6)
When an optimal strategy X∗T exists, denote its cdf by F
∗. Intuitively, since V (·) is non-decreasing
and law-invariant, then among all strategies with cdf F , the optimumX∗T must be the cheapest possible
one. This observation is made precise in the following lemma, which is instrumental to the rest of the
paper. We omit the proof, as it is proved in Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014).7
Lemma 1 (Cost-efficiency). Assume that an optimum X∗T of (6) exists and denote its cdf by F . Then,
X∗T is the cheapest (cost-efficient) way to achieve the distribution F at the investment horizon T , i.e.,
X∗T also solves the following problem:
min
XT |XT∼F
E[ξTXT ]. (7)
Furthermore, for any given cdf F , the solution X⋆T to Problem (7) is almost surely (a.s.) unique and
writes as X⋆T = F
−1(1 − FξT (ξT )). Payoffs are cost-efficient if and only if they are non-increasing in
the pricing kernel ξT .
Lemma 1 provides us with an alternative approach to portfolio optimization. Usually, one resorts to
a value function V (·) in order to model preferences and then finds the optimal consumption by solving
Problem (6). Using Lemma 1, one specifies a desired distribution F of terminal wealth up-front8 and
determines the cheapest strategy that is distributed with F .
In general, there may be more than one solution to (6). However, two different solutions must have
different cdfs because the cost-efficient payoff generating a given distribution is unique. In the context
of EUT, V (XT ) = E(U(XT )) for some utility function U(·). When U(·) is not concave, a standard
approach to solving Problem (6) is to introduce the concave envelope of U(·), denoted by UC(·), which
is the smallest concave function larger than or equal to U(·). Reichlin (2013) shows that under some
technical assumptions, the maximizer for UC(·) is also the maximizer for U(·). However, this maximizer
is only unique under certain cases (see Lemma 5.9 of Reichlin (2013)).
In the following section, we reconcile different decision theories by showing that an optimal portfolio
in any behavioral theory that respects FSD can be obtained as an optimal portfolio for a risk averse
investor maximizing a (generalized) expected utility.
7The first part of the lemma corresponds to their Proposition 5. The second part corresponds to their Proposition 2
and Corollary 2. It is also closely related to results that first appeared in Dybvig (1988a, 1988b).
8As aforementioned, it is presumably easier for many investors to describe a target terminal wealth distribution F
than to articulate the value function V (·) governing their investment decision (see e.g., Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe
(2008)).
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4 Explaining Distributions through Expected Utility Theory
In the first part of this section, we show how the traditional expected utility setting with a strictly
increasing and strictly concave utility function on an interval can be used to explain F when it is
strictly increasing and continuous on this interval. The second part shows that, more generally, any
distribution of optimal final wealth can be explained using a “generalized” utility function defined over
R. Since a solution X∗T to the optimization problem (6) is completely characterized by its distribution
F , it follows that X∗T is also optimal for some expected utility maximizer. The last part discusses
tests for verifying whether investor behavior can be rationalized by the (generalized) Expected Utility
Theory.
4.1 Standard Expected Utility Maximization
Definition 1 (U(a,b): set of utility functions). Let (a, b) ⊂ R where a, b ∈ R (with R = R∪{−∞,+∞}).
We define a set U(a,b) of utility functions U on (a, b) such that U : (a, b)→ R is continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing on (a, b), U ′ is strictly decreasing on (a, b) (so that the investor is risk averse),
U(c) = 0 for some c ∈ (a, b), U ′(a) := limxցaU ′(x) = +∞, and U ′(b) := limxրb U ′(x) = 0.
Note that Inada’s conditions correspond to a = c = 0 and b = +∞.
Definition 2 (Rationalization by Standard Expected Utility Theory). An optimal portfolio choice X∗T
with a finite budget X0 is rationalizable by the standard expected utility theory if there exists a utility
function U ∈ U(a,b) such that X∗T is also the optimal solution to
max
X | E[ξX]=X0
E[U(X)]. (8)
The following lemma finds the optimal payoff for an expected utility maximizer with a utility
function in U(a,b).
Lemma 2. Consider a utility function U in U(a,b). Assume that X0 ∈ (E[ξTa], E[ξT b]). The (a.s.)
unique optimal solution X⋆T to the expected utility maximization (8) is given by
X⋆T :=
[
U ′
]−1
(λ∗ξT )
where λ∗ > 0 is such that E [ξTX∗T ] = X0. Furthermore, X
⋆
T has a continuous distribution F , which is
strictly increasing on (a, b) with F (a+) = 0, F (b−) = 1.
This lemma is proved by Merton (1971) and by Cox and Huang (1989) when Inada’s conditions
are satisfied. Note in particular that in the statement of the lemma, the condition on the budget
automatically disappears when Inada’s conditions are satisfied. The result is presented here in a
slightly more general setting, as it will be needed in what follows. The proof of this lemma (given in
Appendix A.3) illustrates how the pathwise optimization technique (used repeatedly throughout the
paper) can help to solve the standard expected utility maximization (8). The following theorem gives,
for any strictly increasing continuous distribution of final wealth, an explicit construction of the utility
function that explains the investor’s demand in the expected utility maximization framework.
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Theorem 2 (Strictly increasing continuous distribution). Consider a strictly increasing and continuous
cdf F on (a, b) ⊂ R with a, b ∈ R. Assume that the cost of the unique cost-efficient payoff X⋆T solving (7)
is finite and denote it by X0. Then X
⋆
T is also the optimal solution of the expected utility maximization
problem (8) with the following explicit utility function U ∈ U(a,b)
U(x) =
∫ x
c
F−1ξT (1− F (y))dy (9)
for some c such that F (c) > 0. This utility U is unique in U(a,b) up to a linear transformation.
Proof. When U(·) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2, the optimal solution to (8) can be written as
X⋆T :=
[
U ′
]−1
(λ⋆ξT ) , (10)
where λ∗ > 0 is chosen such that E[ξTX⋆T ] = ω0. λ
⋆ exists because of the conditions on U (see also
Lemma 2). From Lemma 1, the unique cost-efficient payoff with cdf F has the following expression
X⋆T = F
−1 (1− FξT (ξT )) . (11)
The utility function U(·) as defined in (9) is constructed to equate (10) and (11). Specifically, using the
properties of continuity and increasingness of FξT , U(·) belongs to U(a,b) and thus satisfies all conditions
of Lemma 2: it is continuously differentiable on (a, b) and for z ∈ (a, b), U ′(z) := F−1ξT (1− F (z)). Then
U(·) is strictly increasing and U ′(·) is strictly decreasing on (a, b). Note also that U(c) = 0, the limit
of U ′(x) is +∞ when x ց a and the limit of U ′(x) is 0 when x ր b because of F−1ξT (1) = +∞ and
F−1ξT (0) = 0. In addition, U(·) is such that[
U ′
]−1
(λ⋆ξT ) = F
−1 (1− FξT (λ⋆ξT )) .
Observe that for λ⋆ = 1, X⋆T ∼ F . By assumption, X0 is the cost of the unique cost-efficient
payoff with distribution F . Therefore, λ⋆ = 1 ensures that E[ξTX
⋆
T ] = X0 and X
⋆
T = [U
′]−1 (ξT ) is
thus the solution to the maximum expected utility problem (8). If there is another utility U2 ∈ U(a,b)
such that X∗T is an optimal solution to (8), then, by the same reasoning as above, we find that
ξT = U
′
2(X
∗
T ) = U
′(X∗T ) a.s.. Since X
∗
T has a strictly increasing distribution on (a, b) (with a positive
density everywhere on (a, b)), U ′2(x) = U
′(x) for all x ∈ (a, b), and thus U2 can be obtained in terms
of a linear transformation of U . 
If an expected utility maximizer chooses a particular investment with distribution of terminal wealth
F , then the only utility function in U(a,b) that rationalizes her choice is given by (9) (up to a linear
transformation). Note also that this utility function (9) involves properties of the financial market at
the horizon time T (through the cdf FξT of the pricing kernel ξT ).
In the second part of this section, we generalize Theorem 2 to include more general distributions
(discrete and mixed distributions). Obviously, any distribution F can always be approximated by a
sequence of continuous strictly increasing distributions, Fn. Then, for each Fn, Theorem 2 allows us
to obtain the corresponding strictly concave and strictly increasing utility function Un ∈ U(a,b) so that
the optimal investment for an expected utility maximizer with utility function Un is distributed with
the cdf Fn. Thus, Theorem 2 already explains approximately the demand for all distributions.
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Rationalization by Standard Expected Utility Theory
To summarize our findings in this section, we formulate the following characterization of consump-
tions that can be rationalizable by standard expected utility theory.
Theorem 3 (Rationalizable consumption by Standard EUT). Consider a terminal consumption XT
at time T purchased with an initial budget X0 and distributed with a continuous cdf F . The eight
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) XT is rationalizable by standard Expected Utility Theory.
(ii) XT is cost-efficient with cdf F .
(iii) X0 = E[ξTF
−1(1− FξT (ξT ))].
(iv) XT = F
−1(1− FξT (ξT )) a.s.
(v) XT is non-increasing in ξT a.s.
(vi) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies FSD.
(vii) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some law-invariant and non-decreasing
objective function V (·).
(viii) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies SSD.
Note that Theorem 3 highlights the strong link between the concept of “cost-efficiency” and “ra-
tionalization” of consumption by Expected Utility Theory. Recall that X ≺fsd Y means that for all
non-decreasing utility functions E[u(X)] 6 E[u(Y )], and X ≺ssd Y means that the expected utilities
are ordered for concave and non-decreasing utility functions. It is thus clear that if V satisfies SSD,
then it satisfies FSD so that (viii) implies (vi) trivially. Our results show that the converse is true and
thus that for the rationalization of consumption by Expected Utility Theory it is only required that
preferences satisfy FSD, which, unlike the case of SSD, is an assumption that is postulated by most
common decision theories.
Remark 1. Theorem 3 cannot be generalized in a discrete setting when the states are not equiprobable
as (vi) is not equivalent to (i).9 For example, take Ω = {ω1, ω2} with P (ω1) = 13 and P (ω2) = 23 , and
ξ1 =
3
4 and ξ2 =
9
8 . Take a budget X0 = 1 and consider X with X(ω1) = a1 and X(ω2) = a2 satisfying
the budget condition a14 +
3a2
4 = 1. Let the objective be defined as V (X) := V aR
+
1/3
(X)1P (X<0)=0
(where V aR+α (X) is defined as V aR
+
α (X) := sup{x ∈ R, FX(x) 6 α}). Note that V (·) is clearly
law-invariant and non-decreasing. Thus, V (·) satisfies FSD. It is clear that V (·) is maximized for
X∗ defined through X∗(ω1) = 0 and X∗(ω2) = 43 . By contrast, we can show that X
∗ is never
optimal for an expected utility maximizer with non-decreasing concave utility U on [0, 43 ] (range of
consumption). To this end, assume without loss of generality that U(0) = 0 and U(43) = 1. Consider
Y such that Y (ω1) =
4
3 and Y (ω2) =
8
9 . Observe that E[ξY ] = E[ξX
∗] = 1. By concavity of U,
U( 8
9
)−U(0)
8/9 >
U( 4
3
)−U(0)
4/3 , and thus U(
8
9) >
2
3 . Hence, E[U(Y )] =
1
3U(
4
3) +
2
3U(
8
9) >
7
9 > E[U(X
∗)] = 23 .
The equivalence of (vii) and (viii) shows that Afriat’s (1972) theory shares a similar idea, as
explained in the following remark.
9Using Proposition 1 and the results of (Bernard, Boyle, and Vanduffel 2014) in the discrete setting, it is possible to
prove a discrete version of Theorem 3 assuming states are equiprobable.
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Remark 2. Consider observations of prices and quantities for a given set of goods over some period of
time (t = 1, 2, ..., n). At time t, one observes a vector of prices pt = (p
1
t , ..., p
n
t ) for n goods as well
as the respective quantities of each good purchased qt = (q
1
t , ..., q
n
t ). Afriat (1972) aims at finding a
utility function u such that at any time t,
u(qt) = max
q
{
u(q) | ptt · q 6 ptt · qt
}
,
where u(q) is to be understood as the utility of consuming q. Note that ptt · qt is the price of the
consumption bundle qt and the constraint p
t
t · q 6 ptt · qt reflects the fact that q was also an available
consumption at time t. Under some conditions (called cyclical consistency), Afriat (1972) proves the
existence of a strictly increasing, continuous and concave function. In his recent review on revealed
preferences, Vermeulen (2012) explains that a“violation of cyclical consistency implies that a consump-
tion bundle that is revealed [as] preferred to some other bundle is strictly less expensive than [the] other
bundle. Nevertheless, the consumer has chosen the revealed worse and more expensive bundle, which
implies that this consumer violates the utility maximization hypothesis”. We observe that our condition
for a terminal consumption (portfolio) to be an optimum for an expected utility maximizer is also
related directly to its cost and to the fact that it is the cheapest consumption with that distribution
(cost-efficient consumption).
Theorem 3 can be used to test whether or not an observed demand for a terminal consumption
can be rationalized by expected utility theory. Assume that an investor chooses to invest his initial
budget X0 from 0 to time T in such a way that he is generating a payoff XT at time T . A simple test
to investigate whether this investment choice is rationalizable by Expected Utility Theory consists in
checking conditions (ii) or (iii) of the theorem. This idea corresponds to the steps taken by Amin and
Kat (2003) to determine in another context whether a hedge fund is efficient. 10 Note that this test is
based only on the cost of the payoff. If the distribution of returns is not obtained in the cheapest way,
it may be caused by an optimal investment criterion that does not satisfy FSD. This is also a potential
explanation for the pricing kernel puzzle (Brown and Jackwerth (2004), Hens and Reichlin (2013)).
4.2 Generalized Expected Utility Maximization
In the previous section, we used cost-efficiency to construct a utility function that is continuously
differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing on an interval (a, b) with a, b ∈ R to explain
the demand for continuous and strictly increasing distributions on (a, b). The same approach can be
used to construct a “generalized” utility function defined on the entire real line R, which explains the
demand for any distribution. A generalized utility function does not need to be either differentiable
on (a, b) or strictly concave. It is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (U˜(a,b): set of generalized utility functions). Let (a, b) ⊂ R. We say that U˜ : R → R
10Specifically, they observe the initial investment in a hedge fund and discuss whether the distribution of returns of the
fund could have been obtained in a cheaper way.
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belongs to the set of generalized utility functions U˜(a,b) if U˜(x) writes as
U˜(x) :=

U(x) for x ∈ (a, b),
−∞ for x < a,
U(a+) for x = a,
U(b−) for x > b,
where U : (a, b) → R is strictly increasing and concave on (a, b). We then define U˜ ′ (with abuse of
notation) on R as follows. On (a, b), U˜ ′ denotes the left derivative of U˜ . For x < a, U˜ ′(x) := +∞.
U˜ ′(a) := limxցaU ′(x) and U˜ ′(b) := limxրb U ′(x), and for x > b, U˜ ′(x) = 0. Conventions: if a = −∞
then U˜(a) := limxցaU(x) and U˜ ′(a) := +∞, if b =∞ then U˜(b) := limxրb U(x) and U˜ ′(b) := 0.
Definition 4 (Rationalization by Generalized Expected Utility Theory). An optimal portfolio choice
X∗T with a finite budget X0 is rationalizable by the generalized standard expected utility theory if there
exists a utility function U˜ ∈ U˜(a,b) such that X∗T is also the optimal solution to
max
XT | E[ξTXT ]=X0
E
[
U˜(XT )
]
. (12)
The following lemma finds the optimal payoff for a generalized expected utility maximizer with a
utility function in U˜(a,b).
Lemma 3. Consider a generalized utility function U˜ of U˜(a,b). Assume that X0 ∈ (E[ξT a], E[ξT b]).
The optimal solution X⋆T to the generalized expected utility maximization (12) exists, is a.s. unique
and is given by
X⋆T :=
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(λ∗ξT )
where U˜ ′ is as defined in Definition 3 and where λ∗ > 0 is such that E [ξTX⋆T ] = X0 and[
U˜ ′
]−1
(y) := inf
{
x ∈ (a, b) | U˜ ′(x) 6 y
}
, (13)
with the convention that inf{∅} = b. Furthermore, X⋆T has potential mass points.
Lemma 3 is proved in Appendix A.5 and allows us to derive a unique implied generalized expected
utility to rationalize the demand for any distribution.
Theorem 4. Let F be a distribution. Let X⋆T be the optimal solution to (7) for the cdf F . Denote its
cost by X0 and assume that it is finite: then X
⋆
T is also the optimal solution to Problem (12) where U˜ :
R→ R is a generalized utility function defined as
U˜(x) :=
∫ x
c
F−1ξT (1− F (y))dy (14)
with some c > a such that F (c) > 0. Conventions: F−1ξT (1) = +∞, F
−1
ξT
(0) = 0, if x1 < x2 then∫ x2
x1
(+∞)dy = +∞, and ∫ x1x2 (+∞)dy = −∞ and ∫ x1x1 g(y) = 0 for all g valued in R¯. U˜(·) is unique in
the class of generalized utilities up to a linear transformation.
Rationalization by Generalized Expected Utility Theory
We can summarize our findings in this section by the following theorem, which is similar to Theorem
12
3 but now includes all possible distributions of final wealth.
Theorem 5. Consider a terminal consumption XT at time T purchased with an initial budget X0 and
distributed with F . The following eight conditions are equivalent:
(i) XT is rationalizable by Generalized Expected Utility Theory.
(ii) XT is cost-efficient.
(iii) X0 = E[ξTF
−1(1− FξT (ξT ))].
(iv) XT = F
−1(1− FξT (ξT )) a.s.
(v) XT is non-increasing in ξT a.s.
(vi) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies FSD.
(vii) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some law-invariant and non-decreasing
objective function V (·).
(viii) XT is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies SSD.
The proof of this theorem is identical to that of Theorem 3 by replacing expected utility with
generalized expected utility and is thus omitted.
5 From Distributions to Utility Functions
In this section, we use the results of the previous sections to derive utility functions that explain the
demand for some financial products and for some distributions of final wealth for agents with preferences
satisfying FSD. Let us start with a simple example showing how one can recover the popular CRRA
utility function from a lognormally distributed final wealth. This example is particularly useful when
explaining the optimal demand for a retail investor who chooses an equity-linked structured product
with capital guarantee. The last example deals with an example of non-expected utility: Yaari’s dual
theory of choice. In this case, we are able to exhibit the non-decreasing concave utility function such
that the optimal strategy in Yaari’s (1987) theory is also obtained in an expected utility maximization
framework.
For ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to the one-dimensional Black-Scholes model with one
risky asset, ST .
11 In this case, the pricing kernel ξT is unique and can be expressed explicitly in terms
of the stock price ST as follows:
ξT = α
(
ST
S0
)−β
, (15)
where STS0 ∼ LN
(
(µ − σ22 )T, σ2T
)
, α = exp
(
θ
σ
(
µ− σ22
)
T −
(
r + θ
2
2
)
T
)
, β = θσ and θ =
µ−r
σ .
Formula (15) is well-known and can be found for example in Section 3.3 of Bernard et al. (2014). It
follows that
ξT ∼ LN
(
−rT − θ
2T
2
, θ2T
)
. (16)
11All developments can be executed in the general market setting given in Section 3. However, closed-form solutions
are more complicated or unavailable.
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Assume first that consumption is restricted on (0,∞) and that the investor wants to achieve a log-
normal distribution LN (M,Σ2) at maturity T of her investment. The desired cdf is F (x) = Φ ( lnx−MΣ ),
and from (15) it follows that F−1ξT (y) = exp
{
Φ−1(y)θ
√
T − rT − θ2T2
}
. Applying Theorem 2, the utility
function explaining this distribution writes as
U(x) =
 ax
1− θ
√
T
Σ
1− θ
√
T
Σ
θ
√
T
Σ 6= 1
a log(x) θ
√
T
Σ = 1
, (17)
where a = exp(Mθ
√
T
Σ − rT − θ
2T
2 ). This is a CRRA utility function with relative risk aversion
θ
√
T
Σ . A
more thorough treatment of risk aversion is provided in Section 6.
5.1 Explaining the Demand for Capital Guarantee Products
Many structured products include a capital guarantee and have a payoff of the form YT = max(G,ST ),
where ST is the stock price and K is the (deterministic) guaranteed level. ST has a lognormal dis-
tribution, ST ∼ LN (M,σ2T ), where M := lnS0 +
(
µ− σ22
)
T so that the cdf for YT is equal to
FYT (y) = 1y>GΦ
(
ln y−M
σ
√
T
)
. Since YT has a mixed distribution (with mass point at K), we can apply
Theorem 4 to derive the corresponding utility function. Let p := Φ
(
lnG−M
σ
√
T
)
and define the following
discrete and continuous cdfs:
FDYT (y) =
{
0 y < G
1 y > G
, FCYT (y) =
 0 y < GΦ( lny−Mσ√T )−p
1−p y > G
. (18)
Then, we can see that FYT (y) = pF
D
Y (y) + (1 − p)FCYT (y). When x < K, U˜(x) = −∞. The utility
function U˜ belongs to U˜(K,∞) and is given by
U˜(x) =

−∞ x < G,
ax
1− θσ−G1− θσ
1− θ
σ
x > G, θσ 6= 1,
a log( xG) x > G,
θ
σ = 1,
(19)
with a = exp(Mθσ − rT − θ
2T
2 ). The mass point is explained by a utility that is infinitely negative for
any level of wealth below the guaranteed level. The CRRA utility above this guaranteed level ensures
the optimality of a lognormal distribution above the guarantee, as aforementioned.
5.2 Yaari’s Dual Theory of Choice Model
Optimal portfolio selection under Yaari’s (1987) dual theory involves maximizing the expected value
of the terminal payoff under a distorted probability function. Specifically, under Yaari’s dual theory
of choice, decision makers evaluate the “utility” of their non-negative final wealth XT (with cdf F ) by
calculating its distorted expectation Hw [XT ] :
Hw [XT ] =
∫ ∞
0
w (1− F (x)) dx, (20)
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where the (distortion) function w : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is non-decreasing with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
The investor’s initial endowment is X0 > 0. He and Zhou (2011) find the optimal payoff when the
distortion function is given by w(z) = zγ where γ > 1. They show that there exists12 c such that the
optimal payoff is equal to
X⋆T = B1ξT6c, (21)
where B = X0e
rTΦ
(
ln c+rT− θ2T
2
θ
√
T
)
> 0 is chosen such that the budget constraint E[ξTX
⋆
T ] = X0 is
fulfilled. The corresponding cdf is
F (x) =
 Φ
(
−rT− θ2T
2
−ln c
θ
√
T
)
0 6 x < B
1 x > B
. (22)
We find that the utility function U˜ ∈ U˜(0,B) is given by
U˜(x) =

−∞ x < 0,
c(x− c) 0 6 x 6 B,
c(B − c) x > B.
(23)
The utility function such that the optimal investment in the expected utility setting is similar to the
optimum in Yaari’s framework (1987) is simply linear up to a maximum c(B − c) and then constant
thereafter.
6 From Distributions to Risk Aversion
In this section, we compute risk aversion directly from the choice of the distribution desired by the
investor and from the distribution of the log pricing kernel. We then show that it coincides with
the Arrow-Pratt measures for risk aversion when the distribution is continuous. Next, we show that
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is equivalent to terminal wealth exhibiting a spread greater
than the market variable HT := − log(ξT ). In a Black-Scholes setting, agents thus have DARA
preferences if and only if they show a demand for distributions with tails that are “fatter than normal”.
Our characterization for DARA also allows us to construct an empirical test for DARA preferences
that is based on observed investor behavior.
For ease of exposition, we assume that all distributions in this section are twice differentiable. We
denote by G the cdf of HT and by g its density, and we assume that g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
6.1 Risk Aversion Coefficient
Definition 5 (Distributional Risk Aversion Coefficient). Let F be the distribution desired by the in-
vestor. Let G and g be the cdf and density of − log(ξT ), respectively. Consider a level of wealth x such
12It is proved that c is the unique root on
(
1, γe−rT
)
of the function
[
Φ
(
lnx+rT+ θ
2
T
2
θ
√
T
)]γ−1
×[
xΦ
(
lnx+rT+θ
2
T
2
θ
√
T
)
− γe−rTΦ
(
lnx+rT+ θ
2
T
2
θ
√
T
)]
.
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that x = F−1(p) for some 0 < p < 1. We define the absolute and relative risk aversion at x as
A(x) = f(F
−1(p))
g(G−1(p))
, R(x) = F−1(p)f(F
−1(p))
g(G−1(p))
(24)
where
f(y) := lim
ε→0
F (y + ε)− F (y)
ε
(25)
when this limit exists. If F is differentiable at y, then f(y) = F ′(y). If F has a density, then
F ′(y) = f(y) at all y.
Recall that the Arrow-Pratt measures for absolute and relative risk aversion, A(x) resp. R(x), can
be computed from a twice differentiable utility function U as A(x) = −U ′′(x)U ′(x) and R(x) = xA(x) .
Theorem 6 (Arrow-Pratt measures for risk aversion). Consider an investor who targets a cdf F for
his terminal wealth (with corresponding f defined as (25)). Consider a level of wealth x in the interior
of the support of the distribution F . Then x = F−1(p) for some 0 < p < 1. The Arrow-Pratt measures
for absolute and relative risk aversion at x are given, respectively, as
A(x) = f(F
−1(p))
g(G−1(p))
, R(x) = F−1(p)f(F
−1(p))
g(G−1(p))
. (26)
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix A.7. Expression (26) shows that the coefficient for
absolute risk aversion can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio and is linked directly to the financial
market (through the cdf G of the negative of the log pricing kernel HT ).
6.2 Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
We provide precise characterizations of DARA in terms of distributional properties of the final wealth
and of the financial market. In what follows, we only consider distributions that are twice differentiable.
Theorem 7 (Distributional characterization of DARA). Consider an investor who targets some distri-
bution F for his terminal wealth. The investor has (strictly) decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
if and only if
y 7→ F−1(G(y)) is strictly convex on R. (27)
The investor has asymptotic DARA (DARA for a sufficiently high level of wealth) if and only if there
exists y⋆ ∈ R such that y 7→ F−1(G(y)) is strictly convex on (y⋆,∞).
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix A.8. The convexity of the function F−1(G(x)) reflects
the fact that the target distribution F is “fatter-tailed” than the distribution G. In other words, F is
larger than G in the sense of transform convex order (Shaked and Shantikumar (2007), p. 214).
Theorem 7 extends recent results by Dybvig and Wang (2012) in another direction. These authors
show that if agent A has lower risk aversion than agent B, then agent A purchases a distribution that is
larger than the other in the sense of SSD. Here, we show that the risk aversion of an agent is decreasing
in available wealth if and only if the agent purchases a payoff that is heavier-tailed than the market
variable HT .
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Theorem 8. Consider an investor with optimal terminal wealth WT ∼ F . The investor has decreasing
absolute risk aversion if and only if WT is increasing and strictly convex in HT .
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix A.9. Note that an investor with optimal terminal
wealth WT ∼ F such that F has right-bounded support does not exhibit DARA.13
6.3 The case of a Black-Scholes market
In a Black-Scholes market we find from (16) that HT is normally distributed, with mean rT +
θ2T
2 and
variance θ2T . It is then straightforward to compute
A(x) = θf(x)
√
2piT exp
(
1
2
[
Φ−1(1− F (x))]2) , R(x) = θxf(x)√2piT exp(1
2
[
Φ−1(1− F (x))]2) .
The financial market thus influences the risk aversion coefficient A(x) through the instantaneous Sharpe
ratio θ = µ−rσ . Interestingly, the effect of the financial market on the risk aversion coefficient A(x)
is proportional and does not depend on available wealth x. This also implies that in a Black-Scholes
market, the properties of the function x→ A(x) are solely related to distributional properties of final
wealth and do not depend on particular market conditions. This observation is implicit in the following
theorem.
Theorem 9 (DARA in a Black-Scholes market). Consider an investor who targets some cdf F for his
terminal wealth. In a Black-Scholes market the investor has decreasing absolute risk aversion if and
only if
f(F−1(p))
φ(Φ−1(p))
is strictly decreasing on (0, 1) (28)
or, equivalently,
F−1(Φ(x)) is strictly convex on R, (29)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the density and the cdf of a standard normal distribution.
The proof of this Theorem is given in Appendix A.10. When F is the distribution of a normal
random variable, the ratio (28) becomes constant. This confirms the well-known fact that the demand
for a normally distributed final wealth in a Black-Scholes market is tied to a constant absolute risk
aversion (see Section 7.1 for a formal proof). In a Black-Scholes setting, the property of DARA remains
invariant to changes in the financial market. This is, however, not true in a general market, where risk
aversion, demand for a particular distribution and properties of the financial market are intertwined.
If the final wealth W has a lognormal distribution F , then one has F−1(Φ(x)) = exp(x). Since the
exponential function is clearly convex, Theorem 9 implies that, in a Black-Scholes market, the demand
for a lognormal distribution corresponds to DARA preferences. One can also readily show that the
exponential distribution also corresponds to DARA preferences in this setting. Effectively, from (29),
we only need to show that the survival function 1 − Φ(x) of a standard normal random variable is
13Recall that k(x) := F−1(G(x)) is non-decreasing. Since F is right-bounded, there exists b ∈ R, k(x) 6 b (x ∈ R). We
need to show that k(x) cannot be strictly convex (x ∈ R). We proceed by contradiction, so let k(x) be strictly convex.
This implies that it remains above its tangent. As it is non-constant and non-decreasing, there exists a point x for which
the tangent has a positive slope and thus goes to infinity at infinity. It is thus impossible for k to be bounded from above.
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log-concave.14
Consider for all x ∈ R such that F (x) < 1, the hazard function h(x) := f(x)1−F (x) , which is a useful
device for studying heavy-tailed properties of distributions. The hazard function for an exponentially
distributed random variable rate function is clearly constant, so that a non-increasing hazard function
reflects a distribution that is heavier-tailed than an exponentially distributed random variable. It is
therefore intuitive that investors exhibiting a demand for distributions with a non-increasing hazard
function exhibit DARA preferences. The following theorem makes this precise.
Theorem 10 (Sufficient conditions for DARA). Consider an investor who targets some cdf F for her
terminal wealth. Denote its density by f . If the hazard function h(x) is non-increasing (resp. non-
increasing for x > k) or, equivalently, if 1− F (x) is log-convex (resp. log-convex for x > k), then the
investor has decreasing absolute risk aversion (resp. asymptotic DARA).
We remark from the proof (Appendix A.11) that a random variable with non-increasing hazard
function h(x) must assume values that are almost surely in an interval [a,∞) where a ∈ R. A lognor-
mally distributed random variable thus has no non-increasing hazard function (but still satisfies the
DARA property).
7 Distributions and Corresponding Utility Functions
We end this paper with a few examples illustrating the correspondence between the distribution of
final wealth and the utility function.
7.1 Normal Distribution and Exponential Utility
Let F be the distribution of a normal random variable with mean M and variance Σ2. Then, from
Theorem 2, the utility function explaining this distribution writes as
u(x) = − Σa
θ
√
T
exp
(
−xθ
Σ
√
T
)
(30)
where a = exp
(
Mθ
√
T
σ − rT − θ
2T
2
)
and θ = µ−rσ . This is essentially the form of an exponential utility
function with constant absolute risk aversion
A(x) = θ
√
T
Σ
.
Note that the absolute risk aversion is constant and inversely proportional to the volatility Σ of the
distribution. A higher volatility of the optimal distribution of final wealth corresponds to a lower
absolute risk aversion. This is consistent with Dybvig and Wang (2012), who show that lower risk
aversion leads to a larger payoff in the sense of SSD.15 Reciprocally, consider the following exponential
14This is well-known in the literature and can be seen as a direct consequence of a more general result attributed
to Pre´kopa (1973), who shows that the differentiability and log-concavity of the density implies log-concavity of the
corresponding distribution and survival function. It is clear that a normal density is log-concave and thus also its survival
function.
15In case of two normal distributions with equal mean, increasing SSD is equivalent to increasing variance.
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utility function defined over R,
U(x) = − exp(−γx), (31)
where γ is the risk aversion parameter and x ∈ R. This utility has constant absolute risk aversion
A(x) = γ. The optimal wealth obtained with an initial budget X0 is given by
X⋆T = X0e
rT − θ
γσ
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T +
θ
γσ
ln
(
ST
S0
)
, (32)
where θ = µ−rσ is the instantaneous Sharpe ratio for the risky asset S, and thus X
⋆
T follows a normal
distribution N
(
X0e
rT + θγσ (µ− r)T,
(
θ
γ
)2
T
)
.
7.2 Lognormal Distribution and CRRA and HARA Utilities
The HARA utility is a generalization of the CRRA utility and is given by
U(x) =
1− γ
γ
(
ax
1− γ + b
)γ
, (33)
where a > 0, b + ax1−γ > 0. For a given parametrization, this restriction puts a lower bound on x if
γ < 1 and an upper bound on x when γ > 1. If −∞ < γ < 1, then this utility displays DARA. In the
case γ → 1, the limiting case corresponds to a linear utility. In the case γ → 0, the utility function
becomes logarithmic: U(x) = log(x+ b). Its absolute risk aversion is
A(x) = a
(
ax
1− γ + b
)−1
. (34)
The optimal wealth obtained with an initial budget X0 is given by
X⋆T = C
(
ST
S0
) θ
σ(1−γ)
− b(1− γ)
a
where C =
X0erT+
b(1−γ)
a
exp
(
θ
σ(1−γ)
(
r−σ2
2
)
T+
(
θ
1−γ
)2
T
2
) . Its cdf is
FHARA(y) = Φ
 ln
(
y+ b(1−γ)
a
C
)
+ θσ(γ−1)
(
µ− σ22
)
T
θ
γ−1
√
T
 .
Observe that the optimal wealth for a HARA utility is a lognormal distribution translated by a constant
term.
When b = 0, the HARA utility reduces to CRRA and the optimal wealth is LogNormal LN (M,Σ2)
over R+. We showed in Section 5 that the utility function explaining this distribution is a CRRA utility
function. It has decreasing absolute risk aversion
A(x) = θ
√
T
xΣ
where θ =
µ− r
σ
.
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7.3 Exponential Distribution
Consider an exponential distribution with cdf F (x) = 1 − e−λx where λ > 0. The utility function in
(9) in Theorem 2 cannot be obtained in closed-form and does not correspond to a well-known utility.
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is given by
A(x) = θλ
√
2piT exp
(
−λx+ 1
2
[
Φ−1
(
e−λx
)]2)
.
We have already shown that A(x) is decreasing and thus that the exponential distribution corresponds
to a utility function exhibiting DARA.
7.4 Pareto Distribution
Consider a Pareto distribution with scale m > 0 and shape α > 0, defined on [m,+∞). Its pdf is
f(x) = α m
α
xα+1
1x>m. The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for x > m is given by
A(x) = θαm
α
√
2piT
xα+1
exp
(
1
2
[
Φ−1
(
mα
xα
)]2)
.
Bergstrom and Bagnoli (2005) show that 1 − F (x) is log-convex. Theorem 10 thus implies that the
Pareto distribution corresponds to DARA preferences.
Conclusions
Assuming investors’ preferences satisfy FSD, our results can be used to non-parametrically estimate the
utility function and the risk aversion of an investor, based solely on knowledge of the distribution of her
final wealth (when optimally investing) and of the distribution of the pricing kernel (e.g., estimated in
a non-parametric way, as per Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2001)). Another application consists in inferring the
utility function that rationalizes optimal investment choice in non-expected utility frameworks (e.g.,
cumulative prospect theory or rank dependent utility theory).
Our results suggest inherent deficiencies in portfolio selection within a decision framework that
satisfies FSD (equivalently with a law-invariant non-decreasing objective function). When the market
exhibits a positive risk premium, Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014) show that for every put con-
tract there exists a derivative contract that yields the same distribution at a strictly lower cost but
without protection against a market crash. Then, the demand for standard put contracts can only be
rationalized in a decision framework that violates FSD and in which background risk as a source of
state-dependent preferences comes into play. Similarly, insurance contracts provide protection against
certain losses and provide a payout when it is needed. For this reason, they often appear more valu-
able to customers than (cheaper) financial payoffs with the same distribution (Bernard and Vanduffel
(2014)). Thus, it would be useful to seek to develop decision frameworks in which FSD can be violated,
for example considering ambiguity on the pricing kernel, Almost Stochastic Dominance (ASD) (Levy
(2006), chapter 13) or state-dependent preferences (Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014), Chabi-Yo,
Garcia and Renault (2008)).
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A Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 on page 5
Proof. Using the concavity of U(·), it is clear that for i ∈ {1, 2, ...N},
∀x > x∗i ,
U(x)− U(x∗i )
x− x∗i
6 U ′(x∗i ), ∀x < x∗i ,
U(x)− U(x∗i )
x− x∗i
> U ′(x∗i ). (35)
Thus for all x ∈ R, and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, using (4) and (35),
U(x∗i )− ξix∗i = U(x∗i )− U ′(x∗i )x∗i > U(x)− U ′(x∗i )x = U(x)− ξix.
Therefore, for all ω ∈ Ω, and terminal consumption X,
U(X∗(ω))− ξ(ω)X∗(ω) > U(X(ω))− ξ(ω)X(ω). (36)
Since X∗ solves (1), E[ξX∗] = X0. Then, for all terminal consumption X such that E[ξX] = X0
(that is, all attainable consumption with the given budget X0), after taking the expectation of (36),
E[U(X∗)] > E[U(X)]. In other words, X∗ also solves (3). 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 on page 7 .
Assume that V (·) is non-decreasing and law-invariant and consider X and Y with respective distribu-
tions FX and FY . Assume that X ≺fsd Y . One has, for all x ∈ (0, 1), F−1X (x) 6 F−1Y (x). Let U be
a uniform random variable over (0, 1). Hence, F−1X (U) 6 F
−1
Y (U) a. s. . Moreover, X ∼ F−1X (U) and
Y ∼ F−1Y (U) so that V (X) = V (F−1X (U)) 6 V (F−1Y (U)) = V (Y ). Thus V (·) satisfies FSD. Conversely,
assume that V (·) satisfies FSD. If X ∼ Y , then X ≺fsd Y and Y ≺fsd X, which implies V (X) = V (Y )
and thus law invariance. Clearly, if X 6 Y a. s. then X ≺fsd Y and V (X) 6 V (Y ). 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2 on page 8
Given ω ∈ Ω, consider the following auxiliary problem
max
y∈(a,b)
{U(y)− λξT (ω)y} (37)
with λ ∈ R+. This is an optimization over the interval (a, b) of a concave function. The first-order
conditions imply that the optimum y∗ is at U ′(y) − λξT (ω) = 0, i.e., y∗ = [U ′]−1(λξT (ω)). For each
ω ∈ Ω, define the random variable Y ⋆λ by Y ⋆λ (ω) = y∗ so that
Y ⋆λ (ω) = [U
′]−1(λξT (ω)).
Choose λ∗ > 0 such that E[ξTY ⋆λ∗ ] = X0. The existence of λ
∗ is ensured by the conditions imposed
on U(·), by continuity of λ 7→ E[ξTY ⋆λ ] and the fact that the budget X0 ∈ (E[ξTa], E[ξT b]). For every
21
final wealth XT that satisfies the budget constraint of (8), we have by construction,
U(XT (ω))− λ∗ξT (ω)XT (ω) 6 U(Y ⋆λ (ω))− λ∗ξT (ω)Y ⋆λ (ω)
since Y ⋆λ (ω) is the optimal solution to (37). Now, take the expectation on both sides of the above
inequality. As E[ξTXT ] = E[ξTYλ⋆ ] = X0, we obtain
E[U(XT )] 6 E[U(Y
⋆
λ∗)],
which ends the proof that Y ⋆λ∗ is optimal for Problem (8). Since [U
′]−1(·) is strictly decreasing and ξT
has a continuous distribution, it is clear that Y ⋆λ∗ has a continuous and strictly increasing distribution
on (a, b) with F (a+) = 0 and F (b−) = 1. 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3 on page 10
(vi) and (vii) are equivalent because of Theorem 1. Given that XT has distribution F , we have that
(ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are equivalent as a consequence of Lemma 1 and of the earlier work of Dybvig
(1988a, 1988b) and Bernard et al. (2014) on cost-efficiency. In addition, it has already been noted that
a solution to (6) must be cost-efficient (Lemma 1). Thus (vi) or (vii) implies (ii) From Theorem 2, it is
clear that a cost-efficient payoff is the solution to an expected utility maximization (so (ii) implies (i)).
Finally observe that if XT is rationalizable by the standard expected utility maximization then (vii)
also holds true (so (i) implies (vii)). We have proved that the seven first statements are equivalent.
Let’s prove the equivalence with (viii). Assume (viii) and observe that if V (·) satisfies SSD16 then
V (·) satisfies also FSD17, thus (viii) implies (vi). We have also proved that (vi) is equivalent to (i).
But then (i) implies (viii) because X → V (X) := E[u(X)] where u is concave in U(a,b) satisfies SSD.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3 on page 12
Take U˜ ∈ U˜(a,b) (Definition 3). Note that U(x) is concave and strictly increasing and (a, b) ⊂ R, which
implies that U˜(x) is continuous and strictly increasing on (a, b), Hence, the left and right derivatives
of U˜ exist at each point of (a, b) and are equal to each other, except in a countable number of points
where U˜ is not differentiable; see also Proposition 17, Chapter 5, Section 5 of Royden (1988)). We can
then conclude that U˜ ′ is left-continuous and decreasing on (a,∞) with discontinuities in a set (xi)i∈I
with xi ∈ (a, b] and I ⊂ N (note that b can also be a point of non-differentiability). There is also a
countable number of non-empty open intervals of R on which U˜ ′ is constant (they are disjoint open
intervals of R and thus countable). Define {yi}i∈J the countable set of values taken by U˜ ′ on these
intervals (with J ⊂ N). Let λ > 0 and define
A =
⋃
i∈J
{ω ∈ Ω | λξT (ω) = yi}.
P (A) = 0 as it is a countable union of sets, each with zero probability (given that ξT is continuously
distributed).
16X is smaller then Y for SSD, X ≺ssd Y , when for all u concave and non-decreasing, E[u(X)] 6 E[u(Y )].
17X is smaller then Y for FSD, X ≺fsd Y , when for all u non-decreasing, E[u(X)] 6 E[u(Y )].
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The proof consists further of three steps:
Step 1: Given λ > 0 and ω ∈ Ω\A, we show below that the a.s. unique optimum of
max
y∈[a,b]
{
U˜(y)− λξT (ω)y
}
(38)
is equal to Y ⋆λ (ω) :=
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(λξT (ω)) ∈ R, where the inverse of U˜ ′ is defined by (13),
Step 2: The a.s. optimum of
max
y∈R
{
U˜(y)− λξT (ω)y
}
(39)
is then also equal to Y ⋆λ (ω) too because
∀z > b, U˜(z)− λξT (ω)z < U˜(b)− λξT (ω)b
and
∀z < a, U˜(z)− λξT (ω)z < U˜(a)− λξT (ω)a,
since for z > b, U˜(b) = U˜(z), and ∀z < a, U˜(z)− λξT (ω)z = −∞ and λ > 0.
Step 3: If there exists λ > 0 such that the pathwise optimum Y ⋆λ satisfies the budget constraint
E[ξTY
⋆
λ ] = X0, then Y
⋆
λ solves Problem (12) (note that P (A) = 0). The existence of λ is guaranteed
thanks to the budget constraint X0 ∈ (E[ξTa], E[ξT b]), the property that the cost as a function of
λ is continuous on (0,∞), and the facts that if λ → +∞ the limit of the pseudo inverse of the left
derivative is a and that if λ→ 0, the limit of the pseudo inverse of the left derivative is b.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3, the only remaining step to prove is Step 1. For λ > 0, we have
that λξT (ω) > 0. Denote by
x∗ :=
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(λξT (ω))
where
[
U˜ ′
]−1
is defined in (13). Specifically it is
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(y) = inf
{
x ∈ (a, b) | U˜ ′(x) 6 y
}
, so that it is
clear that x∗ ∈ [a, b]. Note that x∗ ∈ R. Indeed, if a = −∞ then x∗ > a because U˜ ′(a) =∞. Similarly
if b = +∞, then x∗ < b because U˜ ′(b) = 0. Thus, x∗ ∈ R in all cases. Let us prove that x∗ is an
optimum. As U˜ ′ is left-continuous, U˜ ′(x∗) > λξT (ω) and we consider the following two cases:
Case 1: U˜ ′(x∗) = λξT (ω). Then for x ∈ (a, x∗),
U˜(x∗)− λξT (ω)x∗ − (U˜ (x)− λξT (ω)x) =
[
U˜(x∗)−U˜(x)
x∗−x − λξT (ω)
]
(x∗ − x)
> (λξT (ω)− λξT (ω))(x∗ − x) = 0,
where we use the concavity of U˜(x) (specifically, the fact that the slope U˜(x
∗)−U˜(x)
x∗−x is larger than
U˜ ′(x∗) = λξT (ω)). For x ∈ (x∗, b), using the concavity of U˜(x) again, we have that
U˜(x∗)− λξT (ω)x∗ − (U˜(x)− λξT (ω)x) =
[
− U˜(x)−U˜ (x∗)x−x∗ + λξT (ω)
]
(x− x∗)
> (−λξT (ω) + λξT (ω))(x− x∗) = 0.
For all x ∈ (a, b) we have proved that U˜(x∗)−λξT (ω)x∗− (U˜(x)−λξT (ω)x) > 0. The same inequality
also holds for x = a and x = b (we take take limits if a = −∞ or b =∞)
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Case 2: U˜ ′(x∗) > λξT (ω). This implies that x∗ is at some point of non-differentiability xi, x∗ = xi,
and the left derivative of U˜ in xi is strictly larger than its right derivative, which we denote by a
(r)
i .
U˜ ′(xi) = U˜ ′(x∗) > λξT (ω) > a
(r)
i . Observe that when a < x < xi, by concavity of U˜(x),
U˜(xi)− λξT (ω)xi − U˜(x) + λξT (ω)x =
(
U˜(xi)−U˜(x)
xi−x − λξT (ω)
)
(xi − x)
> (U˜ ′(xi)− λξT (ω))(xi − x) > 0.
When b > x > xi, using the concavity of U˜(x) again,
U˜(xi)− λξT (ω)xi − U˜(x) + λξT (ω)x =
(
− U˜(x)−U˜(xi)x−xi + λξT (ω)
)
(x− xi)
> (−a(r)i + λξT (ω))(x− xi) > 0,
> (−U˜ ′(xi) + λξT (ω))(x − xi) > 0.
For all x ∈ (a, b), and thus for all x ∈ [a, b], we have proved that U˜(xi)−λξT (ω)xi−(U˜(x)−λξT (ω)x) >
0.
We can thus conclude that x∗ is an optimum. It is also unique unless U˜(y) − λξT (ω) is flat at x∗,
but by assumption ω ∈ Ω\A and thus the slope of y 7→ U˜(y)− λξT (ω)y can never be 0 on an interval
that is not reduced to a point. This ends the proof of Step 1 and thus Lemma 3 is proved. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4 on page 12.
First step: Verify that U˜ in (14) belongs to U˜(a,b) for some real numbers a and b.
Define a = inf{x | F (x) > 0} and b = sup{x | F (x) < 1}. Let us prove that U˜ ∈ U˜(a,b).
Observe that FξT (1−F (y)) > 0 for all y ∈ (a, b) (because ξT is continuously distributed) and thus
U˜ is strictly increasing on (a, b). Its left derivative for y ∈ (a, b) is given by
U˜ ′(y) = F−1ξT (1− F (y)) . (40)
It is clear that it is non-increasing on (a, b) and thus U˜ is concave on (a, b). U˜(a) and U˜(b) are well-
defined (potentially in R¯).
Since F−1ξT (1) = +∞, F
−1
ξT
(0) = 0 and using the convention that the integral of +∞ between x1
and x2 is +∞ when x1 < x2 and −∞ when x1 > x2 then U˜(y) = −∞ for y < a and U˜(y) = U˜(b) for
y > b. We have that
U˜ ′(a) = lim
yցa
F−1ξT (1− F (y))
When a = −∞, then U˜ ′(y)→ +∞ when y → a because F−1ξT (1) = +∞. When b =∞, then U˜
′(y)→ 0
when y → b because F−1ξT (0) = 0.
Second step: Apply Lemma 3 and compute the distribution of X∗T . Using Lemma 3, the optimal solu-
tion to Problem (12) is
X⋆T :=
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(λ∗ξT )
where λ∗ > 0 is such that E [ξTX⋆T ] = X0, and for y > 0, the pseudo inverse of U˜
′ is defined by
(13). Given its expression in (40),
[
U˜ ′
]−1
(y) = inf
{
x ∈ (a, b) | F−1ξT (1− F (x)) 6 y
}
, which can be
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rewritten as [
U˜ ′
]−1
(y) = inf
{
x ∈ (a, b) | F (x) > 1− FξT (y)
}
= F−1(1− FξT (y)).
where 0 < 1 − FξT (y) < 1 because ξT has a positive density over positive real numbers and y > 0.
Thus
X⋆T = F
−1(1− FξT (λ∗ξT ))
For λ∗ = 1, X⋆T has the distribution F and the right cost X0. We have thus proved the existence and
the form of the generalized utility function that explains the demand for F .
Third step: Uniqueness of U˜ . Assume that there exists a2 and b2 and another generalized utility U˜2 ∈
U˜(a2,b2) such that the optimum has distribution F . From Lemma 1, there is a unique cost-efficient
payoff with cdf F (i.e., it is given as F−1(1−FξT (ξT ))). From Lemma 3, there is a unique optimum for
a given generalized utility U˜2 for the generalized expected utility maximization given by
[
U˜ ′2
]−1
(λ∗ξT ),
so we get that
F−1(1− FξT (ξT )) =
[
U˜ ′2
]−1
(ξT ) a.s.
Thus, [
U˜ ′
]−1
(ξT ) =
[
U˜ ′2
]−1
(ξT ) a.s.
We must have a = a2, otherwise, one would be finite while the other side is infinite. We must also have
b = b2, otherwise, one would be 0 while the other one is positive. Finally, two continuous functions
with the same left derivatives at any point on (a, b) must be equal up to a linear transformation. The
uniqueness of the generalized utility is thus proved. 
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6 on page 16
Observe that F−1ξT (y) = exp(−G
−1(1− y)) so that using the expression for U obtained in (9),
U ′(x) = F−1ξT (1− F (x)) = exp(−G
−1(F (x)))
and
U ′′(x) = U ′(x)
−f(x)
g(G−1(F (x)))
.
The stated expression for the absolute risk aversion coefficient A(x) is then obtained, as A(x) = −U ′′(x)U ′(x) .
It is well-defined when F (x) ∈ (0, 1) because g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and G−1 exists on (0, 1). The
expression for the relative risk aversion coefficient R(x) follows immediately. 
A.8 Proof of Theorem 7 on page 16
Denote by F the domain where A(x) is well-defined. To assess the DARA property, we study when
ln(A(x)) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ F. For all x ∈ F, it is clear that x 7→ ln(A(x)) is decreasing if
and only if p 7→ ln(A(F−1(p))) is decreasing on (0, 1). Using expression (26) for A(x) for x ∈ F, and
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differentiating with respect to p, one has that the derivative is negative if and only if for p ∈ (0, 1),
g′(G−1(p))
g2(G−1(p))
>
f ′(F−1(p))
f2(F−1(p))
. (41)
Consider next the auxiliary function y 7→ F−1(G(y)) defined on R. By twice differentiating and using
the substitution q = G(y), one finds that it is strictly convex if and only if for q ∈ (0, 1),
g′(G−1(q))
g2(G−1(q))
>
f ′(F−1(q))
f2(F−1(q))
. (42)
Since (41) and (42) are the same, this last step ends the proof. 
A.9 Proof of Theorem 8 on page 17
Assume that the investor has the DARA property. Consider the variable YT = F
−1(G(HT ))) and
observe that YT ∼ F (because G(HT ) ∼ U(0, 1)). Since k(x) := F−1(G(x)) is strictly convex and
increasing, we only need to prove that YT =WT (a.s.). YT is non-increasing in ξT and thus cost-efficient.
It is thus the a.s. unique cost-efficient payoff distributed with F . Since WT is also cost-efficient and
distributed with F it follows that YT =WT (a.s.). Conversely, if WT = k(HT ) then k(x) = F
−1(G(x))
must hold where F is the distribution function of WT (WT is cost-efficient). Since k(x) is strictly
convex the DARA property holds (Theorem 7). 
A.10 Proof of Theorem 9 on page 17
Since G(x) is the distribution function of a normally distributed random variable, it is straightforward
that A(x) is decreasing if and only if (28) holds true. Furthermore, F−1(G(x)) is strictly convex if and
only if F−1(Φ(x)) is strictly convex. The second part of the theorem now follows from Theorem 7. 
A.11 Proof of Theorem 10 on page 18
Proof. Denote by J(x) = 1 − e−λx the distribution of an exponentially distributed random variable.
Since F−1(Φ(x)) = F−1(J(J−1(Φ(x)))) and J−1(Φ(x)) is strictly convex (because the exponential
distribution corresponds to DARA: see footnote 14) and strictly increasing, it is sufficient to show that
F−1(J(x)) is strictly increasing and convex on R+\{0}. Since h(x) is non-increasing, it follows that F
must have support in the form [a,∞) for some a ∈ R so that F is strictly increasing on [a,∞). This
implies that F−1(J(x)) is strictly increasing on R+\{0}. Observe next that log(1 − F (x)) = −λk(x)
where k(x) := H−1(F (x)). Since log(1−F (x)) is convex and decreasing, k(x) is concave and increasing
i.e., k′(x) > 0 and k′′(x) < 0. Straight-forward differentiation yields that k−1(x) = F−1(H(x)) is
convex, which ends the proof. 
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